Abstract. The recently proposed universally composable security framework for analyzing security of cryptographic protocols provides very strong security guarantees. In particular, a protocol proven secure in this framework is guaranteed to maintain its security even when run concurrently with arbitrary other protocols. It has been shown that if a majority of the parties are honest, then universally composable protocols exist for essentially any cryptographic task in the plain model (i.e., with no set-up assumptions beyond that of authenticated communication). When honest majority is not guaranteed, general feasibility results are known only when given a trusted set-up, such as in the common reference string model. Only little was known regarding the existence of universally composable protocols in the plain model without honest majority, and in particular regarding the important special case of two-party protocols.
Introduction
Traditionally, cryptographic protocol problems were considered in a model where the only involved parties are the actual participants in the protocol, and only a single execution of the protocol takes place. This model allows for relatively concise problem statements, simplifies the design and analysis of protocols, and is a natural choice for the initial study of protocols. However, this model of "stand-alone computation" does not fully capture the security requirements from cryptographic protocols in modern computer networks. In such networks, a protocol execution may run concurrently with an unknown number of other copies of the protocol and, even worse, with unknown, arbitrary protocols. These arbitrary protocols may be executed by the same parties or other parties, they may have potentially related inputs and the scheduling of message delivery may be adversarially coordinated. Furthermore, the local outputs of a protocol execution may be used by other protocols in an unpredictable way. These concerns, or "attacks," on a protocol are not captured by the stand-alone model. Indeed, over the years definitions of security became more and more sophisticated and restrictive, in an effort to guarantee security in more complex, multi-execution environments. However, in spite of the growing complexity, none of the proposed notions guarantee security in arbitrary multi-execution and multi-protocol environments.
An alternative approach to guaranteeing security in arbitrary protocol environments is to use notions of security that are preserved under general protocol composition. This approach was adopted in [C1] , where a general framework for defining security of protocols was proposed. In this framework, called the universally composable (UC) security framework, protocols are designed and analyzed as stand-alone. Yet, once a protocol is proven secure, it is guaranteed that the protocol remains secure even when composed with an unbounded number of copies of either the same protocol or other unknown protocols. This guarantee is provided by a general composition theorem.
UC notions of security for a given task tend to be considerably more stringent than other notions of security for the same task. Consequently, many known protocols (e.g., the general protocol of [GMW] to name one) are not UC secure. Thus, the feasibility of realizing cryptographic tasks requires re-investigation within the UC framework. We briefly summarize the known results.
In the case of a majority of honest parties, there exist UC secure protocols for computing any functionality ([C1] , building on [BGW] , [RB] , and [CFGN] ). Also, in the honest-but-curious case (i.e., when even corrupted parties follow the protocol specification), UC secure protocols exist for essentially any functionality [CLOS] . However, the situation is different when no honest majority exists and the adversary is malicious (in which case the corrupted parties can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification).
In this case, UC secure protocols have been demonstrated for a number of specific (but important) functionalities such as key exchange and secure communication [CK1] , [C2] . Furthermore, in the common reference string model, UC secure protocols exist for essentially any two-party and multi-party functionality, with any number of corrupted parties [CLOS] . 1 In addition, it has been shown that in the plain model (i.e., assuming authenticated channels, but without any additional set-up assumptions), there are a number of natural two-party functionalities that cannot be securely realized in the UC framework. These include coin-tossing, bit commitment, and zero-knowledge [C1] , [CF] .
These results leave open the possibility that useful relaxations of the coin-tossing, bit commitment and zero-knowledge functionalities can be securely realized. A natural open question is what are the tasks that can be securely realized in the UC framework with a malicious adversary, no honest majority, and in the the plain model?
Our results. We concentrate on the case of two-party function evaluation, where the parties wish to evaluate some predefined function of their local inputs. We present extensive impossibility results for both deterministic and probabilistic functions in the UC framework. For some classes of functions, we also present full characterizations of what can and cannot be securely realized in the UC framework. Below, we refer to functions f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) where the designated output of party P 1 is f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and the designated output of party P 2 is f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). We now briefly summarize some of our results (all of the results below relate to feasibility in the plain model):
1. Impossibility for general deterministic functions: Informally stated, a function is said to be completely revealing for party P 1 if party P 2 can choose an input so that the output of the function (when applied to P 1 's input and the input chosen by P 2 ) fully reveals P 1 's input. That is, a function f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) is completely revealing for P 1 if there exists an input x 2 for P 2 so that, for every x 1 , it is possible to derive x 1 from f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). We prove that a deterministic two-party function f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) cannot be securely realized in the UC framework unless it is completely revealing for both P 1 and P 2 .
Characterization for single-input deterministic functions:
A function f is singleinput if it depends on at most one of its two inputs (i.e., f (x 1 , x 2 ) = g(x i ) for some function g and i ∈ {1, 2}). A function g is efficiently invertible if there exists an efficient inverting algorithm M that successfully inverts g for any samplable distribution over the input x. We prove that a deterministic single-input function can be securely realized in the UC framework if and only if it is efficiently invertible. 3. Characterization for same-output deterministic functions: A function f is sameoutput if f 1 = f 2 (i.e., both parties receive the same output). We prove that a deterministic same-output function can be securely realized in the UC framework if and only if it is single-input and efficiently invertible.
Characterization for single-output deterministic functions over finite domains:
A function f is single-output if one of f 1 or f 2 are empty (i.e., only one party receives output). We prove that a deterministic single-output function over a finite (or constantsize) domain can be securely realized in the UC framework if and only if it is completely revealing, as defined above. 5. Impossibility for same-output probabilistic functions: Loosely speaking, we say that a probabilistic function f is unpredictable for P 2 if there exists an input x 1 for P 1 such that for every input x 2 and every possible output value v, there is at least a non-negligible probability that f (x 1 , x 2 ) does not equal v. (That is, f (x 1 , x 2 ) is a random variable that does not almost always accept a single value v. In such a case, f (x 1 , x 2 ) defines a non-trivial distribution, irrespective of the value x 2 that is input by P 2 .) Likewise, f is unpredictable for P 1 if there exists an x 2 such that for every x 1 and every v, with at least non-negligible probability f (x 1 , x 2 ) does not equal v.
We prove that a probabilistic same-output function that is unpredictable for both P 1 and P 2 cannot be securely realized in the UC framework.
2 Interestingly, our results hold unconditionally, in spite of the fact that they rule out protocols that provide only computational security guarantees. We remark that security in the UC framework allows "early stopping," or protocols where one of the parties may abort after it receives its output and before the other party has received output (that is, fairness is not required). Hence, our impossibility results do not, and cannot, rely on an early stopping strategy by the adversary (as used in previous impossibility results like [C4] ). We also note that our impossibility results hold even for the case of static adversaries (where the set of corrupted parties is fixed ahead of time).
Our results provide an alternative proof to previous impossibility results regarding UC zero-knowledge and UC coin-tossing in the plain model [C1] , [CF] . In fact, our results also rule out significant relaxations of these functionalities. We stress, however, that these results do not rule out the possibility of securely realizing interesting functionalities like key-exchange, secure message transmission, digital signatures, and public-key encryption in the plain model. Indeed, as noted above, these functionalities can be securely realized in the plain model [C1] , [CK1] .
Techniques. The proofs of the impossibility results utilize the strong requirements imposed by the UC framework in an essential way. The UC definition follows the standard paradigm of comparing a real protocol execution to an ideal process involving a trusted third party.
3 It also differs in a very important way. The traditional model considered for secure computation includes the parties running the protocol, plus an adversary A that controls a set of corrupted parties. In the UC framework, an additional adversarial entity called the environment Z is introduced. This environment generates the inputs to all parties, reads all outputs, and in addition interacts with the adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the computation. A protocol securely computes a function f in this framework if, for any adversary A that interacts with the parties running the protocol, there exists an ideal process adversary (or "simulator") S that interacts with the trusted third party, such that no environment Z can tell whether it is interacting with A and the parties running the protocol, or with S in the ideal process. On a high level, our results are based on the following observation. A central element of the UC definition is that the real and ideal process adversaries A and S both interact with the environment Z in an "on-line" manner. This implies that S must succeed in simulation while interacting with an external adversarial entity that it cannot "rewind." In a setting without an honest majority or set-up assumptions that can be utilized, it turns out that the simulator S has no advantage over a real participant. Thus, a corrupted party can actually run the code of the simulator.
Given the above observation, we demonstrate our results in two steps. First, in Section 3, we prove a general "technical lemma," asserting that a certain adversarial behavior (which is based on running the code of the simulator) is possible in our model. We then use this lemma in Sections 4 and 5 to prove the respective impossibility results and characterizations mentioned above. (Impossibility for probabilistic functions is proven separately in Section 6, but uses the same ideas.) Loosely speaking, the technical lemma states that a real adversary can do to an honest party "whatever" an ideal process simulator can do. For example, one thing that an ideal process simulator must be able to do is to extract the input used by the real model adversary. Therefore, the lemma states that a real model adversary can also extract the input used by an honest party. This implies that any function that can be securely realized in the UC framework must reveal the input of the participating parties. Thus, only completely revealing functions (as described above) can be securely realized.
Impossibility for variants of the UC definition.
Different variants of the UC definition have been presented. One aspect where these variants differ is regarding the delivery of messages between the ideal functionality and the parties in the ideal model. Our results hold for all known variants. Another issue where some published variants differ is with respect to the running time of the parties. The original UC definition [C1] models polynomial-time computation as "polynomial in the security parameter." In the revised version of [C1] , polynomial-time computation is defined as "polynomial in the input length" [C3] . (The reasons for these changes are discussed in detail in [C3] .) Our impossibility results hold for both of these definitions (without any modification to the proofs). Due to its lack of effect on our results, we ignore this technical detail in the presentation. Finally, we note that adaptive corruption strategies are also not used in proving our results; therefore, impossibility also holds when the adversary is limited to static corruptions.
Impossibility for relaxations of the UC definition.
Our impossibility results also apply to two relaxations of the UC definition. The first relaxation relates to the complexity of the environment. The UC definition models the environment as a non-uniform Turing machine. A natural relaxation to consider is one where the environment is modeled as a uniform machine. (This relaxation was first considered in [HMS] , which also showed that the UC composition theorem holds even when the environment is uniform.) We prove impossibility results also for this relaxation (the results obtained are only slight variations of those proven for the case that the environment is non-uniform).
The second relaxation relates to the order of quantifiers between the adversary and the environment in the definition. The UC definition requires that for every adversary A, there should exist a simulator S such that no environment Z can distinguish a real execution with A from an ideal process execution with S (i.e., the order of quantifiers is ∀A∃S∀Z). Thus, a single simulator S must successfully simulate for all environments Z. A relaxation of this would allow a different simulator for every environment; i.e., ∀A∀Z∃S. This difference is only relevant when considering the UC definition of [C1] , where polynomial-time computation is defined as "polynomial in the security parameter." In this model it is unknown whether or not the definitions with the original and reversed order of quantifiers are equivalent. In contrast, when modeling polynomial-time computation as "polynomial in the input length," as in the UC definition of [C3] , this reversal of quantifiers has no effect. That is, the definitions with the original and reversed order of quantifiers are equivalent [C3] . As we have mentioned, our main results are identical for the definition of [C3] and for the original UC definition of [C1] . However, they do not imply impossibility for the relaxed variant of the definition of [C1] where the order of quantifiers is reversed. We therefore show how to extend our impossibility results (with a few mild modifications) to this relaxed variant as well.
Related work. Characterizations of the functions that are securely computable were made in a number of other models and with respect to different notions of security. For example, in the case of honest-but-curious parties and information-theoretic privacy, characterizations of the functions that can be computed were found for the two-party case [CK2] , [K2] , and for boolean functions in the multi-party case [CK2] . In [BMM] the authors consider a setting of computational security against malicious parties where the output is given to only one of the parties, and provide a characterization of the complete functions. (A function is complete if given a black-box for computing it, it is possible to securely compute any other function.) Some generalizations were found in [K1] . Similar completeness results for the information-theoretic, honest-but-curious setting are given in [KKMO] . Interestingly, while the characterizations mentioned above are very different from each other, there is some similarity in the type of structures considered in those works and in ours (e.g., the insecure minor of [BMM] and the embedded-OR of [KKMO] ). A characterization of the complexity assumptions needed to compute functions in a computational setting (i.e., bounded adversary and arbitrary input sizes) is given in [HNRR] , based on a stand-alone, indistinguishability-based definition of security for the honest-but-curious setting.
Subsequent work. Subsequent to this work, our results have formed the basis for other impossibility results. In order to describe these results, we introduce the terminology of self and general composition. Loosely speaking, a protocol is said to be secure under concurrent general composition if it remains secure when run concurrently with any other arbitrary protocol (thus UC security implies security in this setting). A more restricted type of composition, called concurrent self composition, considers the case that a secure protocol runs concurrently with itself (i.e., it alone is run many times concurrently). We can even further restrict the setting to one where only two parties exist in the network, and they alone run many copies of the protocol.
It has been shown that any definition of security that follows the standard simulatability paradigm and implies security under concurrent general composition implies security under a variant of universal composability where the order of quantifiers is reversed [L1] . Therefore, our impossibility results for this relaxed variant of the UC definition apply to any such definition that implies security under concurrent general composition. Next, it was shown that security under concurrent self composition is actually equivalent to security under concurrent general composition [L2] . Therefore, our impossibility results apply even to the setting of concurrent self composition.
Motivated by our broad impossibility results, and their application to concurrent general and self composition, other subsequent works have considered alternative models and definitions of security for which secure protocols can be constructed. For example, see [PS] and [KLP] , and the discussion in [C3] .
Open questions. Although the impossibility results in this work are quite broad (and even provide full characterizations in some cases), many open questions still remain. First, we do not deal with the case of reactive functionalities at all. Second, we do not deal with functionalities which obtain inputs directly from the adversary and provide outputs directly to the adversary. (Indeed, the ability to "directly communicate with the adversary" was already used to provide meaningful relaxations of functionalities. See for instance the "non-information oracles" of [CK1] .) Third, our impossibility results for general deterministic functionalities and for probabilistic functionalities are far from full characterizations. Thus, we still do not have a full and exact understanding of what functions can and cannot be securely realized under the UC definition in the plain model. Given the wide applicability of impossibility results in the UC framework (as described in the previous paragraph), it is important to resolve these questions fully.
Review of UC Security
We present a very brief overview of how security is defined in the UC framework. See [C1] for further details.
As in other general definitions (e.g., [GL] , [MR] , and [B] ), the security requirements of a given task (i.e., the functionality expected from a protocol that carries out the task) are captured via a set of instructions for a "trusted party" that obtains the inputs of the participants and provides them with the desired outputs. Informally, a protocol securely carries out a given task if running the protocol with a real adversary amounts to "emulating" an ideal process in which the parties hand their inputs to a trusted party who computes the appropriate functionality and hands their outputs back, without any other interaction. We call the algorithm run by the trusted party the ideal functionality, and describe the interaction in the ideal model to be between the parties and the ideal functionality (with the understanding that what we really mean is the trusted party running this functionality).
In order to prove the universal composition theorem, the notion of emulation in this framework is considerably stronger than in previous ones. Traditionally, the model of computation includes the parties running the protocol and an adversary A that controls the communication channels and potentially corrupts parties. "Emulating an ideal process" means that for every adversary A there should exist an "ideal process adversary," or simulator, S such that the distribution over all parties' inputs and outputs is essentially the same in the ideal and real processes. In the UC framework, an additional entity, called the environment Z, is introduced. The environment generates the inputs to all parties, reads all outputs, and in addition interacts with the adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the computation. A protocol is said to securely realize a given ideal functionality F if for any "real-life" adversary A that interacts with the protocol and the environment there exists an "ideal-process adversary" S, such that no environment Z can tell whether it is interacting with A and parties running the protocol, or with S and parties that interact with F in the ideal process. In a sense, here Z serves as an "interactive distinguisher" between a run of the protocol and the ideal process with access to F. A bit more precisely, let REAL π,A,Z be the ensemble describing the output of environment Z after interacting with parties running protocol π and with adversary A. Similarly, let IDEAL F ,S,Z be the ensemble describing the output of environment Z after interacting in the ideal process with adversary S and parties that have access to the ideal functionality F. We note that all entities run in time that is polynomial in the security parameter, denoted by k. In addition, the environment receives an initial input z, and security is required to hold for all such inputs (this makes the environment a non-uniform machine). Security in the UC framework is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 2.1. Let F be an ideal functionality and let π be a two-party protocol. We say that π securely realizes F if for every adversary A there exists an ideal-process adversary S such that for every environment Z, the ensembles IDEAL F ,S,Z and REAL π,A,Z are indistinguishable.
Variants of the UC definition. As we have discussed, our results hold for all known variants of the UC definition. As will become evident from the proofs, the impossibility results are very robust and are not dependent on minor changes to the specific UC formalization.
The plain model. As we have mentioned, our impossibility results here are for the plain model, where no trusted preprocessing phase is assumed. This model is defined as the basic UC model (as described above), together with authenticated channels. (Formally, authenticated channels are modeled by considering the F AUTH -hybrid model, as described in [C1] .)
Non-trivial protocols and the requirement to generate output. As we have mentioned above, in the variant of UC that we consider here, the ideal-process adversary can choose when (if ever) to deliver messages that are sent between the parties and the ideal func-tionality. Consequently, the definition provides no guarantee that a protocol will ever generate output or "return" to the calling protocol. Rather, the definition concentrates on the security requirements in the case that the protocol generates output.
A corollary of the above fact is that a protocol that "hangs," never sends any messages and never generates output, securely realizes any ideal functionality. However, such a protocol is clearly not interesting. We therefore use the notion of a non-trivial protocol [CLOS] . Such a protocol has the property that if the real-life adversary delivers all messages and does not corrupt any parties, then the ideal-process adversary also delivers all messages (and does not corrupt any parties). Thus, non-trivial protocols have the minimal property that when all participants are honest (and the adversary does not prevent any messages from being delivered), then all parties receive output. Our impossibility results are for non-trivial protocols only.
The UC composition theorem. As mentioned, a UC protocol remains secure under a very general composition operation. In particular, it maintains its security even when run concurrently with other arbitrary protocols that are being run by arbitrary sets of possibly different sets of parties, with possibly related inputs. Thus, UC protocols can be used in modern networks, and security is guaranteed. It is therefore of great importance to understand what functions can and cannot be securely realized under this definition. See [C1] for more details.
The Main Technical Lemma for Deterministic Functions
This section contains the main technical lemma that is used for proving our impossibility results. Loosely speaking, the lemma describes an "attack" that is possible against any UC protocol that securely realizes a deterministic function f . This lemma itself does not claim impossibility of securely realizing any functionality. However, in Section 4, we use it for proving all our impossibility results.
Notation. We consider deterministic, polynomial-time computable functions f : X × X → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , where X ⊆ {0, 1} * is an arbitrary, possibly infinite, domain (for simplicity of notation, we assume that both parties' inputs are from the same domain; changing this makes no difference to our results). We note that functions that depend on the security parameter can be derived by defining X = N × {0, 1} * . These functions have two outputs, one for each party. We denote f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) where f 1 denotes the first party's output and f 2 denotes the second party's output.
Motivation. To motivate the lemma, recall the way an ideal-model simulator typically works. Such a simulator interacts with an ideal functionality by sending it an input (in the name of the corrupted party) and receiving back an output. Since the simulated view of the corrupted party is required to be indistinguishable from its view in a real execution, it must hold that the input sent by the simulator to the ideal functionality corresponds to the input that the corrupted party (implicitly) uses. Furthermore, the corrupted party's output from the protocol simulation must correspond to the output received by the simulator from the ideal functionality. That is, such a simulator must be able to "extract" the input used by the corrupted party, in addition to causing the corrupted party to output a value that corresponds to the output received by the simulator from the ideal functionality.
We show that, essentially, a malicious P 2 can do "whatever" the simulator can do. That is, consider the simulator that exists when P 1 is corrupted. This simulator can extract P 1 's input and can also cause its output to be consistent with the output from the ideal functionality. Therefore, P 2 (when interacting with an honest P 1 ) can also extract P 1 's input and cause its output to be consistent with an ideally generated output. Indeed, P 2 succeeds in doing this by internally running the ideal-process simulator for P 1 . In other models of secure computation, this cannot be done because a simulator typically has some additional "power" that a malicious party does not. (This power is usually the ability to rewind a party or to hold its description or code.) Thus, we actually show that in the plain model and without an honest majority, the simulator for the UC setting has no power beyond what a real (adversarial) party can do in a real execution. This enables a malicious P 2 to run the simulator as required. We now describe the above-mentioned strategy of P 2 .
Strategy description for P 2 . The malicious P 2 that we construct internally runs two separate machines (or entities): P a 2 and P b 2 . Entity P a 2 interacts with (the honest) P 1 and runs the simulator that is guaranteed to exist for P 1 , as described above. In contrast, entity P b 2 emulates the ideal functionality for the simulator that is run by P a 2 . Loosely speaking, P a 2 first "extracts" the input used by P 1 . Entity P a 2 then hands this input to P b 2 , who computes the function output and hands it back to P a 2 . Entity P a 2 then continues with the emulation, and causes P 1 to output a value that is consistent with the input that is chosen by P b 2 . We now formally define this strategy of P 2 . We begin by defining the structure of this adversarial attack, which we call a "split adversarial strategy," and then proceed to define what it means for such a strategy to be "successful."
* × {0, 1} * be a polynomial-time function where f 1 and f 2 denote the first and second outputs of f , respectively, and let f be a protocol. Let X 2 ⊆ X be a polynomial-size subset of inputs (i.e., |X 2 | = poly(k), where k is the security parameter), and let x 2 ∈ X 2 . Then a corrupted party P 2 is said to run a split adversarial strategy if it consists of machines P a 2 and P b 2 such that:
2. An execution between (an honest) P 1 running f and P 2 = (P 
2 the value y 1 , and P a 2 continues interacting with P 1 . 4 The choice of x 2 can depend on the values of both x 1 and x 2 and can be chosen by P b 2 according to any efficient strategy. The fact that x 2 must come from the polynomial-size subset of inputs X 2 is needed for proving the existence of a successful split adversarial strategy, as defined below.
Informally speaking, a split adversarial strategy is said to be successful if the value x 1 procured by P a 2 is "equivalent to" (the honest) P 1 's input x 1 with respect to f 2 . That is, the output of P 2 , when computed according to f 2 , is the same whether x 1 or x 1 is used. (Note that x 1 may differ from x 1 with respect to P 1 's output, but we consider the effect on P 2 's output only.) Furthermore, P a 2 should succeed in causing P 1 to output the value
That is, the output of P 1 should be consistent with the value x 2 chosen by P b 2 .
Definition 3.2 (Successful Strategies). Let f be a polynomial-time function and let
f be a protocol, as in Definition 3.1. Furthermore, let k be the security parameter and let Z be an environment who hands an input x 1 ∈ X to P 1 and a pair (X 2 , x 2 ) to P 2 , where X 2 ⊆ X , |X 2 | = poly(k), and x 2 ∈ R X 2 .
5 Then a split adversarial strategy for a malicious P 2 is said to be successful if for every Z as above and every input z to Z, the following two conditions hold in a real execution of P 2 with Z and an honest P 1 :
1. The value x 1 output by P a 2 in step 2(b) of Definition 3.1 is such that for every
, where x 2 is the value chosen by P b 2 in step 2(c) of Definition 3.1.
Loosely speaking, the lemma below states that a successful split adversarial strategy exists for any protocol that securely realizes a two-party function in the plain model. In Section 4 we show that the existence of successful split adversarial strategies rules out the possibility of securely realizing large classes of functions. We are now ready to state the lemma: Lemma 3.3 (Main Technical Lemma). Let f be a polynomial-time two-party function, and let F f be the two-party ideal functionality that receives x 1 from P 1 and x 2 from P 2 , and hands them back their respective outputs f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). If F f can be securely realized in the plain model by a non-trivial protocol f , 6 then there exists a machine P a 2 such that for every machine P b 2 of the form described in Definition 3.1, the split adversarial strategy for
2 ) is successful, except with negligible probability.
Proof. The intuition behind the proof is as follows. If F f can be securely realized by a protocol F , then this implies that for any real-life adversary A (and environment Z), there exists an ideal-process adversary (or "simulator") S. As we have mentioned, the simulator S interacts with the ideal process and must hand it the input that is (implicitly) used by the adversary while controlling the corrupted party. In other words, S must be able to extract the input used by A. The key point in the proof is that S must essentially accomplish this extraction while running a "straight-line black-box" simulation. (This just means that S cannot rewind A and also has no access to its code. Stated differently, S interacts with A just like real parties interact in a protocol execution.) This is shown as follows. Consider the case that Z and A cooperate so that Z runs the adversarial strategy and A does nothing but forward messages between Z and the honest party. In this case, S must extract the input that is implicitly used by Z (since A actually does nothing). However, S interacts with Z like in a real interaction (i.e., in a "straight-line black-box" manner). Therefore, S must successfully extract even in such a scenario. To complete the intuition for success for item (1) of Definition 3.2, consider the case that Z's adversarial strategy is just to follow the protocol instructions of f for the honest P 1 . Then we have that S can extract the honest P 1 's output in a real protocol interaction (because this interaction with P 1 is the same as with Z, where successful extraction is guaranteed). Thus, machine P a 2 just consists of running S with P 1 , in order to obtain P 1 's input. The above intuition relates to success under item (1) of Definition 3.2 (i.e., input extraction). Similar arguments are also used to prove item (2). We proceed to the formal proof.
Assume that F f can be securely realized by a protocol f . Then, for every real-life adversary A, there exists an ideal-process adversary/simulator S such that no environment Z can distinguish between an execution of the ideal process with S and F f and an execution of the real protocol f with A. We now define a specific adversary A and environment Z. The adversary A controls party P 1 and is a "dummy adversary" who does nothing except delivers all messages that it receives from P 2 to Z, and delivers all messages that it receives from Z to P 2 . That is, A merely acts as a bridge that passes messages between Z and P 2 (the first box in Fig. 1 corresponds to this setting). Next we define Z. Let X 2 be some polynomial-size set of inputs (chosen by Z), and let (x 1 , x 2 ) be P 1 and P 2 's respective inputs as decided by Z, where x 2 ∈ R X 2 . Then Z writes x 2 on P 2 's input tape and plays the role of the honest P 1 on input x 1 . That is, Z runs P 1 's protocol instructions in f on input x 1 and the incoming messages that it receives from A (which are in turn received from P 2 ). The messages that Z passes to A are exactly the messages as computed by an honest P 1 according to f . At the conclusion of the execution of f , the environment Z obtains some output, as defined by the protocol specification for P 1 that Z runs internally; we call this Z's local P 1 -output. Z then reads P 2 's output tape and outputs 1 if and only if Z's local P 1 -output equals f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and, in addition, P 2 's output equals f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ); see the first box in Fig. 1 . Observe that in the real-life model Z outputs 1 with probability negligibly close to 1. This is because such an execution of f , with the above Z and A, looks exactly like an execution between two honest parties P 1 and P 2 upon inputs x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Furthermore, all messages between these (honest) parties are delivered by the adversary. Intuitively, in such an execution, both parties must receive output, and this output is exactly f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), respectively. Formally, this holds by the assumption that f is a non-trivial protocol. Thus, in the ideal process, the parties must receive f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), respectively. By the indistinguishability between the real and ideal processes, the same must also hold in a real execution (except with negligible probability). We conclude that Z outputs 1 in the real-life model, except with negligible probability.
By the assumption that f securely realizes F f , there exists an ideal process simulator S for the specific A and Z described above (the second box in Fig. 1 corresponds to the setting in which S operates). We use S to obtain the required strategy for P a 2 (the
The Real Model
The Ideal Model
The Split Adversarial Strategy third box in Fig. 1 shows how this strategy is derived). Machine P a 2 invokes simulator S and emulates an ideal process execution of S with F f and the above Z. That is, every message that P a 2 receives from the honest P 1 in the real execution of f , it forwards to S as if S received it from Z. Likewise, every message that S sends to Z in the emulation, P a 2 forwards to P 1 in the real execution. When S outputs a value x 1 that it intends to send to F f , entity P a 2 hands it to P b 2 . Then, when P a 2 receives a value y 1 back from P b 2 , it passes this to S as if it was sent from F f , and continues with the emulation. (Recall that this value y 1 is computed by P b 2 and equals f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), for some x 2 ∈ X 2 of P b 2 's choice. ) We now prove that, except with negligible probability, the above P a 2 is such that for every P b 2 of the form described in Definition 3.1, party
2 ) is a successful split adversarial strategy. That is, we prove that items (1) and (2) from Definition 3.2 hold with respect to this P 2 . We begin by proving that, except with negligible probability, the value x 1 output by P a 2 is such that for every
. In order to demonstrate this, we first claim that up until the point that P a 2 outputs x 1 , the real execution between P 1 (with input x 1 ) and
2 ) is identical to the ideal process with the above environment Z (with input x 1 ), the ideal functionality F f and the simulator S. This follows from the fact that in the ideal process, Z plays the honest P 1 strategy upon input x 1 . Therefore, the messages that S receives from Z are distributed exactly like the messages that P a 2 forwards to S from the honest P 1 in the real execution between P 1 and
2 ). Furthermore, S is given the same initial state in both scenarios. (Note that, in general, in the ideal process S is given the strategy and input of A. However, the adversary A here has no input and follows a straightforward deterministic strategy. Thus, S is exactly the same in the ideal process and in the emulation by
We conclude that the distribution over the messages sent in both processes is identical until the point that S outputs x 1 . (See Fig. 1 that highlights the equivalence between the ideal process and a real execution with the split adversary strategy.) We now show that in the ideal process with F f and Z, simulator S must obtain and send F f an input x 1 such that for every x 2 ∈ X 2 , f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), except with negligible probability. This suffices for proving item (1) because if S obtains such an x 1 in the ideal process, then it also obtains it in the emulation with
2 ) where the distribution over all messages sent is identical.) This can be seen as follows. Assume, by contradiction, that with non-negligible probability x 1 is such that for somex 2 ∈ X 2 , f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ). Now, if in an ideal execution, P 2 has inputx 2 and S sends x 1 to F f , then
. By the specification of Z, when this occurs Z outputs 0. Now, recall that X 2 is of polynomial size and that P 2 's input is uniformly chosen from the set X 2 . Furthermore, the probability that S sends x 1 is independent of the choice of x 2 for P 2 (because S has no information on x 2 when it sends x 1 ). Therefore, the probability that Z outputs 0 is at least 1/|X 2 | times the probability that x 1 as output by S is such that for somex 2 , f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ). Thus, Z outputs 0 in the ideal process with non-negligible probability. However, we have already argued above that in a real protocol execution, Z outputs 0 with at most negligible probability. Thus, Z distinguishes the real and ideal executions, contradicting the security of the protocol. We conclude that except with negligible probability, item (1) of Definition 3.2 holds.
We proceed to prove item (2) of Definition 3.2. Assume by contradiction, that in the emulation with
2 ) with non-negligible probability. First, consider the following thought experiment: Modify P b 2 so that instead of choosing x 2 as some function of x 1 and x 2 , it choosesx 2 ∈ R X 2 instead; denote this modified partyP b 2 . It follows that with probability 1/|X 2 |, the value chosen by the modifiedP b 2 equals the value chosen by the unmodified P b 2 . Therefore, the probability that P 1 outputsỹ 1 = f 1 (x 1 ,x 2 ) in an emulation with the modifiedP 2 = (P a 2 ,P b 2 ) is at least 1/|X 2 | times the (non-negligible) probability that this occurred with the unmodified P b 2 . Since X 2 is of polynomial size, we conclude that P 1 outputsỹ 1 = f 1 (x 1 ,x 2 ) with non-negligible probability in an emulation with the modifiedP 2 = (P a 2 ,P b 2 ). Next, we claim that the view of S in the ideal process with Z and F f is identical to its view in the modified emulation byP 2 = (P a 2 ,P b 2 ). The fact that this holds until S outputs x 1 was shown above in the proof of item (1). The fact that it holds from that point on follows from the observation that in the emulation byP 2 = (P
However, this is exactly the same as it receives in an ideal execution (where Z chooses x 2 ∈ R X 2 and gives it to the honest P 2 ). It follows that the distribution of messages received by P 1 in a real execution withP 2 = (P a 2 ,P b 2 ) is exactly the same as the distribution of messages received by Z from S in the ideal process. Thus, Z's local P 1 -output in the ideal process is identically distributed to P 1 's output in the emulation withP 2 = (P a 2 ,P b 2 ). Since with non-negligible probability, in this emulation P 1 outputs y 1 = f 1 (x 1 ,x 2 ), we have that with non-negligible probability, Z's local P 1 -output in the ideal process is also not equal to y 1 = f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), where x 1 and x 2 are the inputs chosen by Z (notice that x 2 andx 2 are identically distributed). Therefore, Z outputs 0 in the ideal process with non-negligible probability (since Z outputs 1 only if its local P 1 -output equals f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) where (x 1 , x 2 ) are the inputs that it chose). Thus, Z distinguishes the real and ideal processes. This completes the proof.
Split adversarial strategies for P 1 . Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 can all be formulated for P 1 instead of P 2 , and the proof is the same (modulo switching the roles of P 1 and P 2 ).
Relaxations of UC.
As we have mentioned, we also prove our impossibility results for two relaxations of the UC definition. Consider first the relaxation obtained by reversing the order of quantifiers between S and Z. It follows that Lemma 3.3 holds without any modification for this relaxation; this is the case because in the proof, Z is a fixed strategy. Therefore, S only needs to simulate successfully for the specific environment Z described in the proof. Next, consider the relaxation of the definition obtained by modeling the environment Z as a uniform machine. In this case a slight variant of Lemma 3.3 is obtained; the only difference being that the set X 2 and the inputs x 1 and x 2 chosen by Z must be uniformly generated.
Impossibility Results for Deterministic Functions
In this section we use Lemma 3.3 in order to prove a number of impossibility results. The results apply to functions with different combinatorial or other properties. Before continuing, we define the following terminology. A function f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) is called same-output if f 1 = f 2 (i.e., both parties receive the same output). Similarly, we say that a function is single-output if either f 1 or f 2 is the constant function outputting the empty string λ (i.e., only one party receives output). Finally, we say that a function is single-input if it depends on the input of only one party. Our impossibility results in this section relate to functions of the above three classes, as well as to general functions (where both parties receive possibly different outputs that possibly depend on both inputs). Note that we actually obtain full characterizations of feasibility for the above three classes of functions (with the limitation that the characterization for single-output functions is only for the case that the domain of the function is finite); these are presented in Section 5. In contrast, we do not obtain full characterizations for general functions; the impossibility results that apply for this general case appear in Section 4.4.
Single-Input Functions which Are Not Efficiently Invertible
This section considers functions that depend on only one party's input. We show that if such a function is not efficiently invertible, then it cannot be securely realized in the UC framework. Intuitively, a function is efficiently invertible if there exists a machine that can find preimages of f (x), when x is chosen according to any efficiently samplable distribution. * is efficiently invertible if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time inverting machine M such that for every distributionX = {X k } over X that is samplable in probabilistic polynomial-time by a non-uniform Turing machine, every polynomial p(·), and all sufficiently large k's,
Discussion. A few remarks regarding Definition 4.1: First, note that every function f over a finite domain X is efficiently invertible. Second, note that a function that is not efficiently invertible is not necessarily even weakly one-way. This is because the definition of invertibility requires the existence of an inverter that works for all distributions, rather than only for the uniform distribution (as in the case of one-way functions). In fact, a function that is not efficiently invertible can be constructed from any NP-language L that is not in BPP, as follows. Let R L be an NP-relation for L, i.e., x ∈ L if and only if there exists a w such that
(This argument holds only when the distributionsX are allowed to be efficiently samplable by a non-uniform Turing machine, but not necessarily efficiently samplable by a uniform one. In this case, for every k the distribution can just output a fixed input (x, w), |x| = k. Then, since the inverting machine M must be able to invert for all such distributions, we have that it must be able to invert all inputs, except with negligible probability. It therefore follows that L ∈ BPP.) Finally, note that the function f L as defined above corresponds in fact to the ideal zero-knowledge functionality for the language L. That is, the ideal functionality F f L as defined above is exactly the ideal zero-knowledge functionality F
for relation R L , as defined in [C1] and [CLOS] . Consequently, the impossibility theorem below (Theorem 4.2) provides, as a special case, an alternative proof that F
R L
ZK cannot be realized unless L ∈ BPP [C1] .
We now prove impossibility for functions that are not efficiently invertible. Proof. The idea behind the proof is that according to Lemma 3.3, a real adversary can always extract the input of the other party by running a split adversarial strategy. Therefore, an ideal adversary can also extract this input. Since this ideal adversary extracts the input based only on the output (because it works in the ideal process), we are able to use it to construct an inverting machine M for the function f , as described in Definition 4.1. We therefore conclude that if F f can be securely realized, then f is efficiently invertible.
Let f : X → {0, 1} * be a polynomial-time function and assume that there exists a protocol f that securely realizes f . Then consider a real execution of f with an honest P 1 and an adversary A who corrupts P 2 . The environment Z for this execution, with security parameter k, samples a value x from some distributionX k and hands it to P 1 . Then Z outputs 1 if and only if, at sometime during the execution, it receives a value x from A where f (x ) = f (x). This concludes the description of Z. We now describe the real-life adversary A. Adversary A runs a successful split adversarial strategy for P 2 (the input chosen by P b 2 in this case is the empty string because f is single-input). By Lemma 3.3, such a successful strategy exists. Now, at some stage of the execution, P a 2 hands P b 2 a value x . When A obtains this value x from P a 2 , it hands it to Z and halts. This concludes the description of A.
We now show that in the real-life model with this A, the environment Z outputs 1 except with negligible probability. This follows from item (1) of Definition 3.2 which implies that the x obtained by A is such that f (x ) = f (x) except with negligible probability. We note that the description of Z refers to "some" distributionX over the inputs. We do not specify this further; rather, a different environment Z is considered for every different distributionX .
Next, consider an ideal execution with the same Z and with an ideal-process simulator S for the above A. Clearly, in such an ideal execution S receives f (x) only (because it has no input and just receives the output of the corrupted party P 2 ). Nevertheless, S succeeds in handing Z a value x such that f (x ) = f (x) except with negligible probability; otherwise, Z would distinguish a real execution from an ideal one.
We now use S to construct an inverting machine M for f . Given y = f (x), M runs S, gives it y as if it was sent by F f , and outputs whatever value S hands to Z. The fact that M is a valid inverting machine follows from the above argument. That is, for every environment Z, the simulator S causes Z to output 1 except with negligible probability. Therefore, for every efficiently samplable distributionX , the machine M succeeds in outputting x such that f (x ) = f (x), except with negligible probability. Thus, f is efficiently invertible, concluding the proof.
Relaxations of UC.
If the environment Z is uniform, then the distributionsX over X must also be uniform. There is no other difference to Theorem 4.2 for this relaxation. However, there are significant differences for the relaxation of UC obtained by reversing the order of quantifiers between S and Z. This is because the above proof assumes that the same simulator S must work for all environments. That is, S succeeds in obtaining x when interacting with every environment Z that uses some distributionX to choose inputs. Therefore, M can invert for every distributionX demonstrating that f is efficiently invertible. However, if a different simulator S could be provided for every Z, then we would only obtain that for every distributionX there exists a machine M which can invert inputs fromX . This does not imply efficient inversion as formulated in Definition 4.1, where a single machine must work for all distributions.
Nevertheless, we do obtain the following impossibility result: If f is such that there exists a single polynomial-time samplable distributionX (called a "hard distribution") for which it is hard for all efficient machines M to invert f (X ), then f cannot be securely realized, even according to the relaxed order of quantifiers for UC. 7 This follows because Z can choose x according to this hard distribution. Then no simulator S can invert the inputs chosen by Z. We remark that an example of such a function f is a (weak) one- Table 1 . An insecure minor (here b = c).
way function (note that the ideal zero-knowledge functionality over hard-on-the-average languages is weakly one-way).
Same-Output Functions with Insecure Minors
This section contains an impossibility result for same-output functions with a special combinatorial property, namely those functions containing an insecure minor. Insecure minors have been used in the past to show non-realizability results in a different context of information-theoretic security [BMM] . Since same-output functions are considered, we drop the f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) notation and consider f :
* is said to contain an insecure minor if there exist inputs α 1 , α 1 , α 2 , and α 2 such that f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) = f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) and f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) = f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ); see Table 1 .
In the case of boolean functions, the notion of an insecure minor boils down to the so-called "embedded-OR"; see, e.g., [KKMO] . Such a function has the property that when P 2 has input α 2 , then party P 1 's input is "hidden" (i.e., given y 2 = f 2 (x 1 , α 2 ), it is impossible for P 2 to know whether P 1 's input, x 1 , was α 1 or α 1 ). Furthermore, α 1 and α 1 are not "equivalent," in that when P 2 has α 2 for input, then the function value when P 1 has x 1 = α 1 differs from its value when P 1 has
We stress that there is no requirement that Table 1 , a may equal b or c, but clearly not both).
We now show that if a same-output function f contains an insecure minor, then f cannot be securely realized in the plain model.
Theorem 4.3. Let f be a polynomial-time same-output two-party function containing
an insecure minor, and let F f be the two-party ideal functionality that receives x 1 and x 2 from P 1 and P 2 respectively, and hands both parties f (x 1 , x 2 ). Then F f cannot be securely realized in the plain model by a non-trivial protocol.
Proof. The idea behind the proof is as follows. Consider a function f with an insecure minor as in Table 1 . Then, in the case that P 2 's input equals α 2 , party P 2 cannot know if P 1 's input was α 1 or α 1 (because in both cases the output of the function is a). However, by Lemma 3.3, if F f can be securely realized, then a successful split adversarial strategy can be used by P 2 to (almost) always obtain P 1 's input. Thus, we conclude that F f cannot be securely realized. 8 8 We note that a function with an insecure minor may be completely revealing (as in Definition 4.5 of Section 4.4). This is because P 2 can always choose to just input α 2 , and it will then always be able to distinguish the case that P 1 's input was α 1 from the case that its input was α 1 . In our proof here, we utilize the fact that f is same-output in order to show that P 2 cannot arbitrarily choose its own input. Specifically, since P 1 receives output as well, the environment is able to check whether or not P 2 used its prescribed input (α 2 or α 2 ), by looking at P 1 's output. This forces P 2 to use its prescribed input. Then, in the case that this input is α 2 , party P 2 is unable to know whether P 1 's input was α 1 or α 1 .
Formally, let f be a polynomial-time same-output two-party function, and let α 1 , α 1 , α 2 , α 2 form an insecure minor in f . Assume by contradiction that F f can be securely realized by a non-trivial protocol f . Then consider a real execution of f with an honest P 1 and an adversary A who corrupts P 2 . The environment Z for this execution chooses a pair of inputs (x 1 , x 2 ) where x 1 ∈ R {α 1 , α 1 } and x 2 ∈ R {α 2 , α 2 }. (Since Z receives auxiliary input, we can assume that it knows the insecure minor α 1 , α 1 , α 2 , α 2 .) Z then writes x 1 and x 2 on P 1 and P 2 's respective input tapes. Furthermore, Z passes A the set X 2 = {α 2 , α 2 }. Finally, Z outputs 1 if and only if the output of P 1 equals f (x 1 , x 2 ) and, in addition, Z receives x 1 from A at the conclusion of the execution. This concludes the description of Z. We now describe the real-life adversary A. Adversary A runs a split adversarial strategy for P 2 . The entity P b 2 in this case simply chooses x 2 = x 2 (i.e., it does not change the input that it received). By Lemma 3.3, a successful strategy for this P b 2 exists. Now, since P 2 is successful, P a 2 must hand P b 2 a value x 1 such that for every x 2 ∈ X 2 , f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). A runs the entire successful strategy of P 2 . In addition, when A sees the value x 1 output by P a 1 , it computes y = f 2 (x 1 , α 2 ). Then, if y = f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ), it concludes that x 1 = α 1 and sends α 1 to Z. However, if y = f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ), it concludes that x 1 = α 1 and sends α 1 to Z. This completes the description of A.
We now show that in the real-life model with this A, the environment Z outputs 1 except with negligible probability. First, by the definition of successful split strategies, P 1 must output f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), except with negligible probability. However, here P b 2 chooses x 2 = x 2 and so we have that except with negligible probability P 1 outputs f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). Next, notice that α 2 ∈ X 2 and f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) = f 2 (α 1 , α 2 ). Therefore, the value x 1 output by P a 2 must match exactly one of α 1 and α 1 . Thus, it must be that A hands Z the correct input x 1 , except with negligible probability. We therefore have that in a real execution, P 1 outputs f (x 1 , x 2 ) and A hands Z the correct value x 1 (except with negligible probability). Thus, by the definition of Z, it outputs 1, except with negligible probability.
In order to derive a contradiction, it suffices to show that for every simulator S for the ideal process, Z outputs 0 with non-negligible probability. In the ideal process, the simulator S receives an input x 2 ∈ {α 2 , α 2 }, sends an inputx 2 of its choice to F f , and receives back f (x 1 ,x 2 ). Now, consider the case that x 2 = α 2 (this occurs with probability 1/2). S has two possible strategies for choosingx 2 :
1. The valuex 2 sent by S to F f is such that f (α 1 ,x 2 ) = f (α 1 ,x 2 ): Let a denote the value f (α 1 , α 2 ), which also equals f (α 1 , α 2 ). Now, x 2 = α 2 . Therefore, f (x 1 , x 2 ) = a for x 1 = α 1 and x 1 = α 1 . However, at least one of f (α 1 ,x 2 ) and x 2 ) ). Therefore, with probability 1/2, the output f (x 1 ,x 2 ) received by P 1 does not equal f (x 1 , x 2 ). (In order to see that this is the correct probability, recall that S receives no information on P 1 's input x 1 before it sendsx 2 . Therefore, we can view an ideal execution as one where S first sendsx 2 and then x 1 ∈ R {α 1 , α 1 } is chosen. Thus, with probability 1/2, the output of P 1 will not equal f (x 1 , x 2 ).) We conclude that Z outputs 0 with probability at least 1/2. 2. The valuex 2 sent by S to F f is such that f (α 1 ,x 2 ) = f (α 1 ,x 2 ): In this case the output received by S reveals nothing about P 1 's input (α 1 or α 1 ). Therefore, S can succeed in sending Z the correct x 1 with probability at most 1/2.
By the above, we have that when P 2 's input equals α 2 , the environment Z outputs 0 with probability at least 1/2. Since P 2 's input is chosen uniformly from {α 2 , α 2 }, we have that this "bad case" also happens with probability 1/2. Combining this together, we conclude that for every possible S, the environment Z outputs 0 in an ideal execution with probability at least 1/4. In contrast, as we have seen, Z outputs 0 with at most negligible probability in the real model. Therefore, Z distinguishes the ideal and real executions with non-negligible probability, in contradiction to the security of f .
Relaxing the requirements regarding same-output. Let f = ( f 1 , f 2 ). Then Theorem 4.3 is stated for the special case of same-output functions where f 1 = f 2 . However, the proof of the theorem only uses the fact that both f 1 and f 2 have an insecure minor in the same place. Thus, the impossibility result is actually more general than stated.
Relaxations of UC. Theorem 4.3 remains unchanged for the relaxation of UC where the order of quantifiers is reversed. However, when a uniform Z is considered, we cannot assume that it always knows an insecure minor in f . Therefore, we require that f has an insecure minor that can be efficiently found by a uniform Turing machine. This holds, for example, in the case that the domain of f is finite.
Same-Output Functions with Embedded XORs
This section contains an impossibility result for same-output functions with another combinatorial property, namely those functions containing an embedded-XOR. A function f is said to contain an embedded-XOR if there exist inputs α 1 , α 1 , α 2 , and α 2 such that the Table 2 .
(In other words, the table describes an embedded-XOR if no two elements in a single row or column are equal. The name "embedded-XOR" originates from the case of boolean functions f , where one can pick A 0 = {0} and A 1 = {1}.) The intuitive idea is that none of the parties, based on its input (among those in the embedded-XOR subdomain), should be able to bias the output towards one of the sets A 0 , A 1 of its choice. In our impossibility proof, we will in fact show a strategy for P 2 to bias the output. We now show that no function containing an embedded-XOR can be securely computed in the plain model.
Theorem 4.4. Let f be a polynomial-time same-output function containing an
embedded-XOR, and let F f be the two-party ideal functionality that receives x 1 and x 2 from P 1 and P 2 , respectively, and hands both parties f (x 1 , x 2 ). Then F f cannot be securely realized in the plain model by a non-trivial protocol.
Proof. Again, we prove this lemma using Lemma 3.3. However, the use here is different. That is, instead of relying on the extraction property (step 2(b) of Definition 3.1 Table 2 . An embedded-XOR -if {a, d} ∩ {b, c} = ∅.
and item (1) of Definition 3.2), we rely on the fact that P 2 can influence the output by choosing its input as a function of P 1 's input (step 2(c)), and then cause P 1 to output the value y that corresponds to these inputs (step 2(d) and item (2) of Definition 3.2). That is, P 2 is able to bias the output, something which it should not be able to do when a function has an embedded-XOR. Formally, let f be a polynomial-time same-output two-party function and let α 1 , α 1 , α 2 , α 2 form an embedded-XOR in f with corresponding sets A 0 , A 1 (as described above). Furthermore, assume that f does not have an insecure minor (otherwise, the theorem already holds by applying Theorem 4.3). Now, assume by contradiction that F f can be securely realized by a protocol f . Then consider a real execution of f with an honest P 1 and an adversary who corrupts P 2 . The environment Z for this execution chooses a pair of inputs (x 1 , x 2 ) where x 1 ∈ R {α 1 , α 1 } and x 2 ∈ R {α 2 , α 2 }. Z then writes x 1 and x 2 on P 1 and P 2 's respective input tapes. Furthermore, Z passes A the set X 2 = {α 2 , α 2 }. Finally, Z outputs 1 if and only if the output of P 1 is in the set A 0 . This concludes the description of Z. We now describe the real-life adversary A. Adversary A runs a split adversarial strategy for P 2 , as follows. When P b 2 receives a value x 1 from P a 2 , it computes v = f (x 1 , α 2 ) and w = f (x 1 , α 2 ). If both v, w ∈ A 0 or both v, w / ∈ A 0 , then P b 2 sets x 2 = α 2 . (This case is just for completeness; as we will see below, it occurs with at most negligible probability.) Otherwise, if v ∈ A 0 and w / ∈ A 0 , then
. Adversary A runs the entire successful strategy and then halts.
We now show that in the real-life model with this A, the environment Z outputs 1, except with negligible probability. In order to see this, first recall that by Lemma 3.3, a successful strategy for the above P b 2 exists. Now, since P 2 is successful, we have that except with negligible probability, P a 2 must hand P b 2 a value x 1 such that for every x 2 ) . Therefore, except with negligible probability, it must be that one of v and w above is in A 0 and the other is in A 1 (otherwise, this condition on x 1 is not fulfilled). Furthermore, by item (2) of Definition 3.2, party P 1 outputs f (x 1 , x 2 ) except with negligible probability. Now, x 2 is chosen so that f (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ A 0 . Since x 2 ∈ X 2 , we also know that f (x 1 , x 2 ) = f (x 1 , x 2 ). Therefore, the value f (x 1 , x 2 ) that is output by P 1 is guaranteed to be in A 0 , except with negligible probability. We conclude that Z outputs 1 in the real-life model (again, except with negligible probability).
In order to derive a contradiction, it suffices to show that for every S, the environment Z outputs 1 in an ideal execution with probability at most 1/2. This is demonstrated by proving that in an ideal execution, S can cause P 1 's output to be in A 0 with probability at most 1/2. In an ideal execution, the simulator S receives an input x 2 ∈ {α 2 , α 2 }, sends an inputx 2 of its choice to F f , and receives back f (x 1 ,x 2 ). The important point here is that P 1 's output is defined as soon as S sendsx 2 to F f . Furthermore, S sendsx 2 to F f without any information whatsoever on P 1 's input x 1 . Now, since f has no insecure minor and f (α 1 , α 2 ) = f (α 1 , α 2 ), it follows that for everyx 2 , f (α 1 ,x 2 ) = f (α 1 ,x 2 ) (otherwise, α 1 , α 1 , α 2 ,x 2 would constitute an insecure minor in f ). Therefore, for x 1 ∈ {α 1 , α 1 } and for everyx 2 , at most one of f (x 1 ,x 2 ) is in A 0 . Since Z chooses x 1 uniformly from {α 1 , α 1 }, we have that no matter what valuex 2 that S sends to F f , the value f (x 1 ,x 2 ) that is output by P 1 is in A 0 with probability at most 1/2. We conclude that for every possible S, the environment Z outputs 0 in an ideal execution with probability at least 1/2. In contrast, Z outputs 0 with at most negligible probability in the real model. Therefore, Z distinguishes the ideal and real executions with non-negligible probability, in contradiction to the security of f .
Relaxations of UC.
As above, Theorem 4.4 remains unchanged for the relaxation of UC where the order of quantifiers is reversed. However, when a uniform Z is considered, we require that f has an embedded-XOR that can be efficiently found by a uniform Turing machine.
Not Completely Revealing Functions
In this section we consider functions that are not completely revealing. This notion does not refer to protocols and information that is "revealed" by them. Rather, it refers to the question of whether or not a party's input is completely revealed by the function output itself. Note that in this section we do not limit ourselves to functions that have only one input or output. Rather, we consider the general case where f 1 and f 2 may be different functions and may depend on both parties' inputs.
Loosely speaking, a function is completely revealing for party P 1 , if party P 2 can choose an input so that the output of the function fully reveals P 1 's input (for all possible choices of P 1 's input). That is, a function is completely revealing for P 1 if there exists an input x 2 for P 2 so that for every x 1 , it is possible to derive x 1 from f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). For example, let us take the maximum function for a given range, say {0, . . . , n}. Then party P 2 can input x 2 = 0 and the result is that it will always learn P 1 's exact input. In contrast, the less-than function (i.e., f (x, y) = 1 iff x < y) is not completely revealing because for any input used by P 2 , there will always be uncertainty about P 1 's input (unless P 1 's input is the smallest or largest in the range). In fact, any function where the range is smaller than the domain, like for the less-than function, cannot be completely revealing. (This holds if there are no equivalent inputs; see below.)
Functions over finite domains.
We first define what it means for a function to be completely revealing for the special case of functions over finite domains (i.e., domains that are of constant-size, and not dependent on the security parameter). The definition in this case is simpler and more intuitive.
We begin by defining what it means for two inputs to be "equivalent": Let f : X × X → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a two-party function and denote f = ( f 1 , f 2 ). Let x 1 , x 1 ∈ X . We say that x 1 and x 1 are equivalent with respect to f 2 if for every x 2 ∈ X it holds that x 2 ) . The rationale for this definition is that if x 1 and x 1 are equivalent with respect to f 2 , then x 1 can always be used instead of x 1 without affecting P 2 's output. We now define completely revealing functions: Definition 4.5 (Completely Revealing Functions over Finite Domains). Let f : X × X → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a polynomial-time two-party function such that the domain X is finite, and denote f = ( f 1 , f 2 ). We say that function f is completely revealing for P 1 if there exists an input x 2 ∈ X for P 2 such that for every two distinct inputs x 1 and x 1 for P 1 that are not equivalent with respect to f 2 , it holds that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ).
Completely revealing for P 2 is defined analogously. We say that a function is completely revealing if it is completely revealing for both P 1 and P 2 .
If a function is completely revealing for P 1 , then party P 2 can set its own input to be the "special value" x 2 from the definition, and then P 2 will always obtain the exact input used by P 1 . Specifically, given y = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), party P 2 can traverse over all X and find the unique x 1 for which it holds that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = y (where uniqueness here is modulo equivalent inputs x 1 and x 1 ). It then follows that x 1 must be P 1 's input (or at least is equivalent to it). Thus we see that P 1 's input is completely revealed by f 2 . In contrast, if a function f is not completely revealing for P 1 , then there does not exist such an input for P 2 that enables it to determine P 1 's input completely. This is because for every x 2 that is input by P 2 , there exist two non-equivalent inputs x 1 and x 1 such that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). Therefore, if P 1 's input happens to be x 1 or x 1 , it follows that P 2 is unable to determine which of these inputs were used by P 1 . Notice that if a function is not completely revealing, P 2 may still learn much of P 1 's input (or even the exact input "most of the time"). However, there is a possibility that P 2 will not fully obtain P 1 's input. As we will see, the existence of this "possibility" suffices for proving impossibility.
Note that we require that x 1 and x 1 be non-equivalent because otherwise, for all intents and purposes, x 1 and x 1 are the same input. That is, x 1 and x 1 could be used interchangeably by P 1 with no affect whatsoever on the output. Notice that if we were to remove the requirement of non-equivalence between x 1 and x 1 , then it may be that a function is not completely revealing simply because for equivalent inputs it holds that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) for every x 2 . Now, recall that if a function is completely revealing, then P 2 should be able to learn the exact input of P 1 by inputting the "special value" x 2 from the definition. In the case of equivalent x 1 and x 1 , it is indeed true that P 2 cannot differentiate between the case that P 1 has input x 1 and the case that P 1 has input x 1 . However, as far as we are concerned x 1 and x 1 are the same input, and so there is nothing to differentiate between them. Thus, the requirement of x 1 and x 1 being not equivalent is natural and follows the intuition of what it means for a function to be completely revealing.
As we have mentioned above, the "less than" function (otherwise known as Yao's millionaires' problem) is not completely revealing, as long as the range of inputs is larger than 2. This can be easily demonstrated.
Functions over infinite domains. In the case of functions that may be over an infinite domain, the definition of completely revealing is slightly more complex. 9 Recall that in the definition of completely revealing for functions over finite domains, we require the existence of a single input x 2 that can reveal P 1 's input, for all possible inputs x 1 ∈ X where X is the entire domain. However, when the domain is infinite, we will only require that for every polynomial-size set X 1 ⊆ X there exists a single input x 2 , such that x 2 can reveal P 1 's input, for any input x 1 ∈ X 1 . Thus, a different x 2 can be used for every subset X 1 of inputs for P 1 . Notice that any function that is completely revealing when a single x 2 can be used to reveal all inputs x 1 , is also completely revealing when every polynomialsize set X 1 can have a different x 2 . However, the reverse is not true (and it is not difficult to construct a concrete example). This modification of the definition therefore makes the set of completely revealing functions larger. Since we prove impossibility for any function that is not completely revealing, this actually weakens our impossibility result. Nevertheless, it is needed for our proof. We now present the formal definition:
, and let k be the security parameter. We say that function f is completely revealing for P 1 if for every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large k's, and every set of inputs X 1 ⊆ X for P 1 of size at most p(k), there exists an input x 2 ∈ X for P 2 , such that for every pair of distinct inputs x 1 , x 1 ∈ X 1 that are not equivalent with respect to f 2 , it holds that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). Completely revealing for P 2 is defined analogously. We say that a function is completely revealing if it is completely revealing for both P 1 and P 2 .
We stress, once again, that "completely revealing" or "not completely revealing" is a property of functions and not of protocols. We now show that a function that is not completely revealing cannot be securely realized in the plain model by any non-trivial protocol.
Theorem 4.7. Let f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) be a polynomial-time two-party function that is not completely revealing, and let F f be the two-party ideal functionality that receives x 1 from P 1 and x 2 from P 2 , and hands f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) to P 1 and f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) to P 2 . Then F f cannot be securely realized in the plain model by a non-trivial protocol.
Proof. The idea behind the proof here is very similar to that of Theorem 4.2. Specifically, according to Lemma 3.3, a real adversary can always extract the input of the other party (or an input equivalent to it) by running a split adversarial strategy. Therefore, an ideal adversary can also extract this input. However, if f is not completely revealing, then it is impossible to extract the exact input (or an input equivalent to it) with high enough probability. We therefore conclude that if F f can be securely realized, then f must be completely revealing.
Let f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) be a polynomial-time two-party function, and assume that there exists a protocol f that securely realizes F f . We now prove that this implies that f is completely revealing. We actually prove that f is completely revealing for P 1 ; the fact that f is also completely revealing for P 2 is proven analogously. Assume by contradiction that f is not completely revealing for P 1 . Then this implies that there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many k's, there exists a set X 1 such that |X 1 | ≤ p(k) and the following holds: For every x 2 there exist at least two inputs x 1 , x 1 ∈ X 1 such that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). Let X 1 be a minimal such set (for a given p(·) and k). (By minimality here, we mean that no input can be removed from X 1 while preserving the requirements in the definition.) We construct a polynomial-size set of inputs X 2 for P 2 as follows. First, we claim that for every pair of inputs x 1 , x 1 ∈ X 1 there exists an input x 2 such that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). This follows from the fact X 1 is minimal and therefore does not contain any two inputs that are equivalent with respect to f 2 . Next, we construct the set X 2 by adding a single value x 2 as above for every x 1 , x 1 ∈ X 1 (i.e., we add an x 2 for which f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) ). Note that since the size of X 1 is polynomial in k, the same holds for X 2 .
We are now ready to define an environment Z and a real-life adversary A for protocol f . The environment Z chooses x 1 ∈ R X 1 and x 2 ∈ R X 2 and writes x 1 and x 2 on P 1 and P 2 's respective input tapes. Furthermore, Z passes A the set X 2 . Finally, Z outputs 1 if and only if at some stage A sends Z the correct input value x 1 used by P 1 . We now describe the adversary A. Adversary A controls party P 2 and runs a successful split adversarial strategy (the exact strategy used by P b 2 to choose x 2 is immaterial here because we only need the value x 1 obtained by P a 2 in the first part of the attack). At some stage of the attack, A obtains the value x 1 that P a 2 passes to P b 2 . Given this value, A finds an inputx 1 ∈ X 1 such that for everyx 2 ∈ X 2 it holds that f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ). A then hands thisx 1 to Z (if such a value does not exist, then A outputs fail).
We now claim that in the real-life model, Z outputs 1 except with negligible probability. This follows from the fact that by Lemma 3.3 a successful split strategy exists for P 2 . Therefore, except with negligible probability, the value x 1 obtained by P a 2 is such that for every
, where x 1 ∈ X 1 is the input that Z writes on P 1 's input tape and X 2 is the polynomial-size set of inputs given to A by Z. This means that there exists at least one valuex 1 ∈ X 1 such that for everyx 2 ∈ X 2 it holds that f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ); specifically, this value is P 1 's correct input x 1 . It remains to show that there is at most one such value, and therefore A sends Z the correct input x 1 . This follows from the construction of X 2 . Specifically, for every x 1 , x 1 ∈ X 1 there exists an input x 2 ∈ X 2 such that f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). Now, let x 1 be the value that A obtains from P a 2 . Then there cannot be two valuesx 1 andx 1 such that for everỹ x 2 ∈ X 2 , f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) and f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ), because this would imply thatx 1 ,x 1 ∈ X 1 result in the same output for allx 2 ∈ X 2 . This is in contradiction to the construction of X 2 . We conclude that there is only one value that passes the test carried out by A, and this is P 1 's correct input x 1 . That is, Z obtains P 1 's correct input from A, and so outputs 1, except with negligible probability.
The proof is concluded by showing that in the ideal process there does not exist a simulator S that can cause Z to output 1 with probability that is negligibly close to 1. This can be seen as follows. The simulator S sends some inputx 2 to F f and receives back f 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ). Furthermore, S sendsx 2 before receiving any information about x 1 . Therefore, we can view the ideal process as one where S first sendsx 2 to F f and then Z chooses P 1 's input x 1 uniformly from X 1 . Now, by our contradicting assumption, since f is not completely revealing for P 1 , for everyx 2 there exist two distinct inputs x 2 ). Therefore, with probability 2/|X 1 |, we have that x 1 ∈ {x 1 ,x 1 }. In this case, information theoretically, S can send Z the correct x 1 with probability at most 1/2. We conclude that in the ideal process, Z outputs 0 with probability at least 1/|X 1 |, for every ideal process simulator S. Since the size of X 1 is polynomial in k, we have that Z distinguishes the real and ideal processes with non-negligible probability, in contradiction to the assumed security of f .
Impossibility of oblivious transfer. We remark that Theorem 4.7 can be used to rule out the possibility of securely realizing the 2-out-of-1 oblivious transfer functionality [R] , [EGL] . This is because this functionality is clearly not completely revealing for the "sender."
Completely revealing functions. We remark that some completely revealing functions can be securely realized in the plain model, and some cannot. The fact that some completely revealing functions can be securely realized is demonstrated below in Section 5.3. In order to see that some completely revealing functions cannot be securely realized, notice that the XOR function f (x 1 , x 2 ) = (x 1 ⊕ x 2 , x 1 ⊕ x 2 ) is completely revealing (e.g., take x 2 = 0 k ). However, by Theorem 4.4, it cannot be securely realized in the plain model.
Relaxations of UC.
Notice that in the proof of Theorem 4.7, the environment Z is fixed. Therefore, the theorem and proof remain the same for the relaxed definition where the order of quantifiers between the environment and simulator is reversed. In contrast, if the environment is assumed to be a uniform machine, then success is only defined with respect to uniform environments (in particular, this means that X 1 and X 2 must be uniformly generated). This is still very general and is equivalent for functions that have finite domains.
Characterizations for Deterministic Functions
This section is organized as follows: We first present a characterization for the case of single-input functions (i.e., functions that depend on only one of the two inputs). Next, we show that functions that do not have an insecure minor or an embedded XOR actually depend on only one input. This is combined to provide a full characterization of same-output functions. Following this, we provide a characterization of single-output functions for the special case that the function domain is finite.
Secure channels. In order to provide full characterizations of feasibility regarding the above-described classes of functionalities, we combine impossibility results proven in Section 4, as well as present protocols where impossibility does not hold. We note that all of the protocols that we present assume the existence of UC-secure channels (which provide both authenticity as well as privacy). We do not define this notion here; details on the definitions and constructions can be found in [CK1] . We do, however, remark that in the plain model as defined here, UC-secure channels can be securely realized under standard complexity assumptions.
Characterization for Single-Input Functions
In this section we show that the notion of "efficient invertibility" in Definition 4.1 actually fully characterizes the single-input functions that can and cannot be securely realized in the framework of universal composability. Recall that we have already proven that it is impossible to securely realize functions that are not efficiently invertible in Theorem 4.2. Proof. As we have mentioned, the fact that F f cannot be securely realized if f is not efficiently invertible has already been shown in Theorem 4.2. It therefore remains to prove that if f is efficiently invertible, then F f can be securely realized. This is achieved by the following simple protocol: Upon input x and security parameter k, party P 1 computes y = f (x) and runs the inverting machine M on (1 k , y). Then P 1 sends P 2 the value x output by M. (In order to guarantee security against an external adversary that does not corrupt any party and so should learn nothing by eavesdropping on the protocol messages, the value x is sent over the UC-secure channel.) Simulation of this protocol is demonstrated by constructing a simulator who receives y = f (x), and simulates P 1 sending P 2 the output of M(1 k , y). The proof is straightforward and so details are omitted.
Relaxations of UC.
Following the proof of Theorem 4.2, we discussed the existence of analogous impossibility results for the relaxations of UC where the environment Z is uniform and for the relaxation where the order of quantifiers is reversed. We note that the characterization described here holds also for the relaxation of UC in which the environment Z is uniform. However, in the case that the order of quantifiers is reversed, the analogous impossibility result obtained is only for "hard-on-the-average" distributions. Therefore, we do not obtain a full characterization. Specifically, we have shown that invertible efficiently functions can be securely realized, and yet functions with hard-on-the-average distributions cannot. However, there may exist functions that are not efficiently invertible and do not have such hard-on-the-average distributions. We do not know whether or not such a function can be securely realized under this relaxation of UC.
Characterization for Same-Output Functions
This section provides a full characterization of the deterministic two-party same-output functionalities that can be securely realized in the plain model. Let f : X ×X → {0, 1}
* be a deterministic two-party function. Each of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 provides a necessary condition for F f to be securely realizable (namely, f should not contain an insecure minor or an embedded-XOR). In addition, Theorem 5.1 gives a characterization of those functionalities F f that can be securely realized, assuming that f depends on the input of one party only. In this section we show that the combination of these three theorems is actually quite powerful. Indeed, we show that this provides a full characterization of the two-party, same-output deterministic functions that can be securely realized. In fact, this characterization turns out to be very simple. Proof. First we prove the theorem for the case that f contains an insecure-minor or an embedded-XOR (with respect to either P 1 or P 2 ). By Theorems 4.3 and 4.4, in this case F f cannot be securely realized. Indeed, such functions f do not solely depend on the input of a single party; that is, for each party there is some input for which the output depends on the other party's input.
Next we prove the theorem for the case that f does not contain an insecure-minor (with respect to either P 1 or P 2 ) or an embedded-XOR. We prove that in this case f depends on the input of (at most) one party and hence, by Theorem 5.1, the present theorem follows. Pick any x ∈ X and let a = f (x, x).
Since f (x, x) = a, both sets are non-empty. Next we claim that at least one ofB 1 andB 2 is empty; otherwise, if there exist α 1 ∈B 1 and α 2 ∈B 2 , then setting α 1 = α 2 = x gives us a minor which is either an insecure minor or an embedded-XOR. To see this, denote b = f (α 1 , x) and c = f (x, α 2 ); by the definition ofB 1 ,B 2 both b and c are different than a. Consider the possible values for
∈ {a, b, c}, we get an embedded-XOR. Thus, we showed that at least one ofB 1 ,B 2 is empty; assume, without loss of generality, that it isB 2 .
We now show that for every x 1 , the function g(·) = f (x 1 , ·) is constant. Fix x 1 . Then we show that for every x 2 , x 3 it must hold that if f (x 1 , x 2 ) = b and f (x 1 , x 3 ) = c, then b = c (thus demonstrating that f (x 1 , ·) is constant). In order to see why this holds, notice that if x 1 = x, then b = c = a because by our assumptionB 2 is empty. On the other hand, if x 1 = x and this is not true, then we obtain an insecure minor in f x 3 ) . This contradicts the assumption that f does not contain an insecure minor.
We conclude that either f (x 1 , ·) is a constant function for every x 1 , or f (·, x 2 ) is a constant function for every x 2 . That is, f depends on the input of at most one party, as needed.
Characterization for Single-Output Functions over Finite Domains
This section contains a full characterization of the single-output two-party functions over finite domains that can be securely realized in the plain model. Recall that a function
* be a polynomial-time single-output function where X is a finite set, and let F f be a functionality that receives x 1 from P 1 and x 2 from P 2 , and sends f (x 1 , x 2 ) to P 2 . Then, assuming UC-secure channels, F f can be securely realized in the plain model by a non-trivial protocol if and only if f is completely revealing for P 1 . (The above also holds when P 1 and P 2 are reversed.) Proof. We have already proven in Theorem 4.7 that if f is not completely revealing for P 1 , then F f cannot be securely realized. It therefore remains to show the converse. That is, assume that f is completely revealing for P 1 . Then, by Definition 4.5, there exists an input x 2 such that for every x 1 , x 1 ∈ X that are not equivalent with respect to f , it holds that f (x 1 , x 2 ) = f (x 1 , x 2 ). This therefore yields the following protocol: Let x 1 be P 1 's input and let X 1 be the set of inputs that are equivalent to x 1 with respect to f 2 . Then P 1 sends P 2 the value x 1 that is lexicographically the smallest in X 1 . (Note that X 1 can be efficiently computed because f has a finite domain.) As in the protocol described in the proof of Theorem 5.1, the value x 1 is sent over a UC-secure channel in order to guarantee security against an external adversary that does not corrupt any party.
First, note that the protocol is non-trivial. Next, in order to see why it securely realizes F f , consider the following ideal-process simulator S (for the case that P 2 is corrupt). Simulator S sends x 2 to F f , where x 2 is the above-mentioned input that is guaranteed to exist for f . S then receives back an output y. Since f has a finite domain, it is possible to compute efficiently the set of values X 1 such that for every
By the assumption that f is completely revealing, this set X 1 is exactly the set of all values that are equivalent to x 1 . S therefore hands the adversary A the lexicographically smallest value from X 1 , as it expects to see in a real execution. This completes the proof.
We note that the above proof cannot be extended to functions that are not single-output. For example, the XOR function over domain {0, 1} is clearly completely revealing. However, if both parties obtain output, then this function cannot be securely realized, as shown in Theorem 4.4.
Probabilistic Same-Output Functionalities
In this section we concentrate on probabilistic two-party functionalities where both parties obtain the same output. We show that probabilistic functionalities that generate non-trivial distributions cannot be securely realized in the plain model in the UC framework. This rules out the possibility of realizing any "coin-tossing style" functionality, or any functionality whose outcome is "unpredictable" whatever the choice of inputs by the parties. It is stressed, however, that our result does not rule out the possibility of securely realizing other useful probabilistic functionalities, such as functionalities where, when both parties remain uncorrupted, they can obtain a random value that is unknown to the adversary. An important example of such a functionality that can indeed be securely realized is key-exchange.
Let f = { f k } be a family of polynomial-time functions where, for each value of the security parameter k, f k : X × X → {0, 1}
* is a probabilistic function. We begin by defining the notion of safe values. Informally, such values have the property that they induce non-trivial distributions over the output. More precisely, let p(·) be a polynomial and let k ∈ N. We say that x 1 ∈ X is a ( p, k)-safe value for P 1 if for every x 2 ∈ X and all possible output values v ∈ {0, 1} * it holds that Pr[ Below, we prove that unpredictable function families cannot be securely realized in the plain model. This is quite a broad impossibility result. In order to see this, consider the structure of a function that is not unpredictable, because, say, P 1 does not have safe values. Such a function has the property that for all but a finite number of k's, for every x 1 ∈ X there exists a value x 2 ∈ X such that almost all of the support of the distribution f k (x 1 , x 2 ) falls on one point v. Now, if P 2 uses input x 2 , then the output of the function will have a trivial distribution (i.e., it will almost always equal a single value v). Thus, it will essentially behave like a deterministic function.
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Theorem 6.1. Let f = { f k } be a family of unpredictable probabilistic polynomial-time same-output functions and let F f be a functionality that, given a security parameter k, receives x 1 from P 1 and x 2 from P 2 , samples a value v from the distribution of f k (x 1 , x 2 ), and hands v to both P 1 and P 2 . Then F f cannot be securely realized in the plain model by any non-trivial protocol.
Proof. The proof uses the same ideas as in the proof of Lemma 3.3 and the proofs of impossibility that use Lemma 3.3. Let f be a family of unpredictable polynomial-time probabilistic functions. Assume, by contradiction, that F f can be securely realized by a protocol f . We prove that in this case there exists an adversary (calledÃ below) that can essentially fix the output. This therefore contradicts the assumption that f is unpredictable.
By the assumption in the theorem, f is a family of unpredictable functions. Therefore, there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many k's, there exist ( p, k)-safe values for P 1 and P 2 . Let k be one these infinitely many k's, and let x 1 and x 2 be the ( p, k)-safe values for P 1 and P 2 , respectively. We are now ready to define a real-life adversary A and an environment Z. Adversary A controls party P 1 and is a dummy adversary who does nothing except deliver messages between Z and P 2 (exactly like A in Lemma 3.3). Next we define Z who uses the above safe values x 1 and x 2 . Environment Z writes x 2 on P 2 's input tape and locally runs P 1 's protocol instructions in f on input x 1 and the incoming messages that it receives from A (that are in turn received from P 2 ). At the conclusion of the execution of f , the environment Z obtains an output, called Z's local P 1 -output. Then Z outputs 1 if and only if its local P 1 -output equals P 2 's output.
We first claim that in the real-life process, Z outputs 1 except with negligible probability. This follows from the fact that the real-life process looks exactly like an honest execution between P 1 and P 2 . Furthermore, all messages between these honest parties are delivered by the adversary. Therefore, since f is non-trivial, both parties must receive output and this output is correct. (The formal argument for this is identical to the argument in Lemma 3.3.)
By the assumption that f securely realizes F f , there exists an ideal-process adversary (simulator) S such that Z cannot distinguish between a real execution of f with A and an ideal process execution with S and F f . In particular, the local P 1 -output received by Z in the ideal process must equal the output that P 2 receives from F f . Recall that in an ideal execution, S sends some input x 1 to F f . Functionality F f then samples a value v from f k (x 1 , x 2 ) and hands this value to both P 1 (who is controlled by S) and P 2 . It follows that except with negligible probability, Z's local P 1 -output must be the exact value v that S receives from F f .
Next, we switch context to a new real-life adversaryÃ that controls P 2 and a new environmentZ. Let x 1 and x 2 be the same values as above (i.e., ( p, k)-safe values for P 1 and P 2 , respectively). The environmentZ writes the input x 1 on P 1 's input tape. In addition,Z waits to obtain a value x 1 from the adversary. When it receives this value,Z samples a value v from the distribution of f k (x 1 , x 2 ) and hands this value to the adversary. Finally,Z outputs 1 if and only if P 1 outputs v. We now defineÃ who controls P 2 . AdversaryÃ works by internally running the simulator S from above, and emulating an ideal execution of S with Z and F f . Each message thatÃ receives from P 1 , it internally passes to S as if it was sent by the environment Z. Likewise, any message that S attempts to send to its environment Z, the adversaryÃ externally sends to party P 1 . When the internal S outputs a value x 1 to be sent to F f , adversaryÃ hands x 1 to the environment Z, obtains the value v back fromZ, and hands v to S.
We claim that in a real-life execution of f withZ andÃ, party P 1 outputs the exact value v generated byZ, except with negligible probability. Consequently, by the definition ofZ, it follows thatZ outputs 1 in a real execution, except with negligible probability. To see that this holds, notice that S's view in an ideal process with Z and F f is identical to its view when it is internally invoked byÃ. Furthermore, the real P 1 that interacts with A has exactly the same view as Z in the ideal process with S. Therefore, the output of P 1 has exactly the same distribution as the local P 1 -output of Z in the ideal process with S. We have already shown that Z's local P 1 -output in this case equals v, except with negligible probability. Therefore, the real P 1 's output also equals v, except with negligible probability. Notice that what we have essentially proven here is analogous to proving thatÃ succeeds in item (2) of a successful split adversarial strategy (as in Lemma 3.3).
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The remainder of the proof shows how the existence of such an adversaryÃ (that succeeds in having P 1 output v) contradicts the security of the protocol for unpredictable functions (this part of the proof is analogous to the proofs of Section 4). Intuitively, since f is unpredictable, a corrupted party should not be able to force the output of an execution to be any one value. However, as we have seen,Ã succeeds in doing just this. Formally, we complete the proof by considering an interaction ofZ in an ideal process with F f and some ideal-process adversaryS that is guaranteed to exist by the assumption that f securely realizes F f . In this ideal execution,Z first writes x 1 and x 2 on P 1 and P 2 's respective input tapes. ThenZ interacts withS in the same way that it interacted withÃ above. That is,Z waits to receive some value x 1 fromS. Then it samples a value v from f k (x 1 , x 2 ) and hands v back toS. Finally,Z outputs 1 if and only if P 1 's output equals v. The above describes the interaction betweenZ andS. In the rest of the ideal execution, the honest P 1 sends its input x 1 to F f , andS sends F f somex 2 of its choice. The functionality F f then samples a value w from f k (x 1 ,x 2 ) and hands it to both P 1 and P 2 . Now,Z outputs 1 if and only if w = v (i.e., P 1 's output equals v). Furthermore, by the assumed security of f , environmentZ outputs 1 except with negligible probability (because this is the case in a real execution withÃ). We conclude that w = v, except with negligible probability. However, we claim that since x 1 and x 2 are ( p, k)-safe values for P 1 and P 2 , respectively, it must be the case that with non-negligible probability w does not equal v. In order to see this, we distinguish between two cases:
1.S sends x 1 toZ before sendingx 2 to F f : In this case,Z samples the value v before F f samples the value w = f k (x 1 ,x 2 ). Since x 1 is a ( p, k)-safe value for P 1 , we have that for everyx 2 and v, the probability that f k (x 1 ,x 2 ) = v is greater than 1/ p(k). 2.S sendsx 2 to F f before sending x 1 toZ: In this case we use the reverse argument to above. That is, w is sampled and fixed beforeZ samples v = f k (x 1 , x 2 ). Therefore, since x 2 is a ( p, k)-safe value for P 2 , the probability that f k (x 1 , x 2 ) = w is greater than 1/ p(k).
We therefore have that for infinitely many k's, environmentZ outputs 0 in the ideal process (because w = v) with probability greater than 1/ p(k). In contrast, as we have shown,Z outputs 1 in the real process except with negligible probability. This contradicts the assumption that f securely realizes F f . We therefore conclude that an unpredictable function f cannot be securely realized in the plain model.
Relaxations of UC.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 remains unchanged for the relaxation of UC obtained by reversing the order of quantifiers between Z and S. When considering the relaxation based on limiting Z to be a uniform machine, we must assume that for infinitely many k's, safe values can be efficiently found by a uniform Turing machine.
Universally composable key exchange. As we have mentioned, the probabilistic functionality of key exchange can be securely realized [CK1] . This does not contradict our results here because in the case that one of the participants in a key exchange protocol is corrupted, it is explicitly given the power to single-handedly determine the value of the output key. Therefore, the key exchange functionality is not unpredictable (there are no safe values). Note that this makes sense for key exchange because it is only meant to protect two honest parties from an eavesdropping adversary.
